Article 253 is a provision in the Constitution of India, 1950, located in Chapter II of Part XI, which grants the Parliament the exclusive and overriding power to make any law for implementing international agreements. The provision was created to ensure that India, as a sovereign state, could fulfill its international obligations and align domestic law with global norms without constitutional impediments arising from the federal division of powers.
The mechanism of Article 253 is established by its opening non-obstante clause: "Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter". This clause gives the Parliament's power to legislate for international commitments an overriding authority over the normal distribution of legislative powers under Article 246. Consequently, Parliament can enact a law on any subject, even one ordinarily reserved for the State List (List II of the Seventh Schedule), if it is for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention or any decision made at an international conference, association or other body.
This provision connects directly to Article 51(c), a Directive Principle of State Policy, which mandates the State to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations. Domestic legislation like the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, was enacted by Parliament using the power granted by Article 253 to implement decisions from international forums. The Supreme Court has reinforced Parliament's supremacy in this domain; for instance, in Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India (1969), the Court affirmed the Union's power to implement international agreements for defining boundaries under Article 253. Furthermore, in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997), the Court invoked international conventions like the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) to frame guidelines, demonstrating the Article's spirit in influencing domestic legal interpretation. The text of Article 253 has remained unchanged since its enactment in 1950, with its scope being consistently affirmed by judicial interpretation.