Judicial Independence is a fundamental concept and institutional feature in India's constitutional democracy, ensuring the judiciary can perform its function as the guardian of the Constitution and protector of fundamental rights without fear or favour. It is broadly divided into two types: Institutional Independence, which protects the judiciary as a whole from the executive and legislature, and Individual Independence, which ensures a judge can decide cases based on law and facts, free from external pressure.
The concept's modern form was enshrined in the Constitution of India, adopted on January 26, 1950, as a deliberate break from the colonial practice where the executive and judiciary were often fused, as seen under the Government of India Act, 1915. The problem it solved was preventing the state from using the courts as an arm of the government, which was common during British rule.
Its mechanism is built on an interlocking set of constitutional safeguards, primarily in Part V (Union Judiciary) and Part VI (State Judiciary). Article 50, a Directive Principle of State Policy, explicitly mandates the State to separate the judiciary from the executive in public services. Key provisions ensure security of tenure, such as judges holding office until age sixty-five for the Supreme Court, and removal only through a rigorous process involving a special majority in both Houses of Parliament under Article 124(4). Financial independence is secured as the salaries and allowances of judges are charged to the Consolidated Fund of India, making them non-votable in Parliament. Furthermore, Article 121 and Article 211 prohibit legislative discussion on a judge's conduct, except during a removal motion.
Judicial Independence is intrinsically connected to the Basic Structure Doctrine, established in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), which ruled that Parliament cannot alter the Constitution's core features, including judicial independence. The mechanism for judicial appointments, known as the Collegium System, emerged from the Three Judges Cases and gives primacy to the judiciary in appointments and transfers.
The system has changed recently with the passage of the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014, which created the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) to replace the Collegium System. However, the Supreme Court struck down the NJAC in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015), ruling that the NJAC undermined judicial independence, which is part of the Basic Structure, and thereby restored the Collegium System.Judicial Independence is a fundamental concept and institutional feature in India's constitutional democracy, ensuring the judiciary can perform its function as the guardian of the Constitution and protector of fundamental rights without fear or favour. It is broadly divided into two types: Institutional Independence, which protects the judiciary as a whole from the executive and legislature, and Individual Independence, which ensures a judge can decide cases based on law and facts, free from external pressure.
The concept's modern form was enshrined in the Constitution of India, adopted on January 26, 1950, as a deliberate break from the colonial practice where the executive and judiciary were often fused, as seen under the Government of India Act, 1915. The problem it solved was preventing the state from using the courts as an arm of the government, which was common during British rule.
Its mechanism is built on an interlocking set of constitutional safeguards, primarily in Part V (Union Judiciary) and Part VI (State Judiciary). Article 50, a Directive Principle of State Policy, explicitly mandates the State to separate the judiciary from the executive in public services. Key provisions ensure security of tenure, such as judges holding office until age sixty-five for the Supreme Court, and removal only through a rigorous process involving a special majority in both Houses of Parliament under Article 124(4). Financial independence is secured as the salaries and allowances of judges are charged to the Consolidated Fund of India, making them non-votable in Parliament. Furthermore, Article 121 and Article 211 prohibit legislative discussion on a judge's conduct, except during a removal motion.
Judicial Independence is intrinsically connected to the Basic Structure Doctrine, established in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), which ruled that Parliament cannot alter the Constitution's core features, including judicial independence. The mechanism for judicial appointments, known as the Collegium System, emerged from the Three Judges Cases and gives primacy to the judiciary in appointments and transfers.
The system has changed recently with the passage of the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014, which created the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) to replace the Collegium System. However, the Supreme Court struck down the NJAC in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015), ruling that the NJAC undermined judicial independence, which is part of the Basic Structure, and thereby restored the Collegium System.